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Abstract 
It has been known for many years that security 
failures are caused at least as often by bad incentives 
as by bad design. However, the regulatory correction 
of bad incentives is not easy in practice and it is still 
lacking. In the meantime, system dynamics models of 
security systems can improve the situation by 
increasing the awareness that misaligned incentives 
can backfire as long-term consequences of security 
failures hit back the principal. We illustrate our 
argument using system archetypes and concept 
simulation models revealing the impact of two different 
security strategies, viz. misaligned incentives (the 
customer having the burden of proof in case of alleged 
fraud) vs the bank having the burden of proof. From 
this we argue that online system dynamics could be 
used in eGovernment to educate principals and the 
public. Also, legal measures could become more 
effective when supported with forensic evidence from 
simulation models. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
An influential article on the economics of 
information security states that “security failures is 
caused at least as often by bad incentives as by bad 
design” [1, p. 610].  
A conspicuous example of misaligned incentives 
causing bad security originates when the organization 
that is most responsible (or in a privileged position) for 
providing system security does not bear the full costs 
of its failure [1, p. 601ff, 2, p. 105ff]. Such bad practice 
contradicts the well-known insight from legal theory 
that liability should rest on the party that can best 
manage the risk. 
Other examples of bad security resulting from 
perverse incentives involve subtle relations between 
the parties in the security “battlefield” [1, p. 161-169], 
such as: 
1) Software vulnerabilities, that is, bugs in the 
software that can be exploited by attackers, are 
numerous and common. Why? Sloppy coding and 
insufficient testing could be avoided – but it costs and 
delays the release of the software. 
2) Users are typically quite ignorant about the 
subtleties of information security whereas software 
developers and vendors of software know much better 
about the quality of their products. In such a situation 
of asymmetric information, software developers prefer 
to rush to the market – so as to lock customers in – by 
releasing products lacking sufficient security features 
that the customer anyhow does not request. 
3) Also, since software of high quality with 
respect to security would cost significantly more than 
software of poor quality security-ignorant users would 
not pay more for features that they lack appreciation 
for. Hence, the market is flooded with cheap software 
lacking appropriate security. In a seminal paper, 
Akerlof showed that when buyers have less 
information – and thus less knowledge – about the 
quality of products as sellers do, both quality and price 
suffers [3]. 
 
2. Proposed measures  
 
Based on the above lessons learned, non-technical 
and primarily legal measures are proposed in [2]: 
1) Ex ante regulation instead of ex post liability 
– this kind of action should make involved entities 
aware in advance that negative consequences may call 
the involved entities for their liability. In case of 
software vendors, these would have to provide 
evidence with the product that it has been subjected to 
adequate (security testing including) development 
cycle. 
2) Information disclosure – this measure would 
stimulate involved entities to act accordingly. In case 
of software producers, shedding the light on a case 
would “disinfect” it. Further, the community has a 
right to know, which would be an additional feedback 
loop to prevent unwanted situations. One such 
2388
Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2017
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/41445
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-0-2
CC-BY-NC-ND
requirement would be a mandated regular disclosure of 
aggregated loss figures related to on-line banking and 
payment cards. Similarly, control systems incidents 
and intrusions should be disclosed as well. 
3) Cyber insurance – such a market would be a 
basis for providing incentives of involved entities to 
take appropriate precautions through better and 
consistent data statistics, risk-adjustments premiums, 
and so on. 
4) Indirect intermediary liability – there are 
reasons that third parties may be held liable for the 
actions of the involved parties. One such successful 
example is the case with payment cards frauds in the 
US. But there also exists an interesting variant of such 
liability in case of Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) – if there is a copyright infringement, an 
internet service provider (IS) is not automatically 
liable. It becomes liable only, if upon notification, it 
does not remove or block the distribution of 
copyrighted material. A similar principle could be 
adopted for ISPs liability in case of malware infection 
– upon notification they should assist their customers 
in malware removal. 
5) Accreditation requirements for software 
engineers. Software now rests at the core of all critical 
infrastructures, while on the other hand almost anyone 
can actually be a programmer. This is by far not the 
case in, e.g., medicine, jurisprudence, mechanical 
engineering, etc. 
In a complex global world it will take a long time 
until effective measures of legal nature have been 
deployed and work as intended. Is it possible to assist 
this process in the meantime, say, by education? 
Following we show that a system dynamics model 
of an archetypal example of misaligned incentives 
explains the impacts of two different security 
strategies, viz. one with misaligned incentives (the 
bank customer having the burden of proof in case of 
alleged fraud) and another with well-aligned incentives 
(the bank having the burden of proof). The first 
strategy led ultimately to major costs to the bank (the 
principal) in terms of compensating the customers who 
suffered from fraud and in delayed investments to 
improve security at much higher cost than the second 
strategy. 
In the last section we conclude that online system 
dynamics could be used in eGovernment to educate 
principals and the public about the impacts of 
misaligned incentives. We argue also that the future 
legal measures could become more effective when 
supported with forensic evidence from simulation 
models. 
 
3. Counter-intuitive impacts of misaligned 
incentives  
 
Misaligned incentives push the costs of security 
failures on third parties, but this is not the whole truth. 
Security systems are complex not only in the sense of 
being composed of a high number of components (the 
so-called combinatorial complexity). The most 
challenging part of the security system complexity is 
the dynamic complexity, induced by the propagation of 
effects over time owing to the interdependencies 
between the system components. Such propagation of 
effects results in unexpected, counterintuitive dynamic 
behavior. In particular, unintended side effects can act 
as boomerangs that, with a time delay, hit back on the 
owner of the security defenses who intends to push the 
costs of bad security to third parties. 
Accordingly, awareness of the dynamic complexity 
of security systems can motivate the owner of security 
defenses to proactively analyze the long-term costs of 
boomerang effects from misaligned incentives versus 
the perceived short-term gains by saving on security 
and pushing the cost of failures on third parties. 
Actually, once the long-term perspective enters into the 
analysis the delayed effects of harming third parties 
may be seen in a new light as additional boomerang 
effects to be considered. It is not unreasonable to hope 
that the rules of the game will tip over as security 
providers increasingly adopt the stance of analyzing 
security system solutions as complex dynamic systems. 
Those providers who adopt the principle that liability 
should rest on the party that can best manage the risk 
will hopefully over time be rewarded in terms of 
customer loyalty and expanding market share. A 
process of insight and education is needed here. 
 
4. Why system dynamics  
 
In this paper we suggest using system dynamics to 
assist mitigating the occurrence of bad incentives 
causing bad information security. 
System dynamics (SD) is an established discipline 
that has a proven application track record in many 
areas [4-6], including in information security. A core 
asset of system dynamics modeling is its proven 
capability to change the mental models of decision 
makers based on insight on the cause effect relations 
shaping intended and unintended consequences. 
Interestingly, an area where system dynamics has 
had a strong impact is modeling for litigation and 
disputes in project management [7-9, 10, p. 170-171]. 
Hence, the question arises as to whether system 
dynamics also could clarify causes and responsibilities 
in terms of post mortem models of disputed cases 
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regarding misaligned incentives in information 
security. We suspend discussion of this question for the 
time being, but we return to the issue in the final 
section of this paper. 
In the next two sections we proceed to analyze a 
case of misaligned incentives so as to illustrate the 
power of system dynamics to reveal unintended long-
term effects and explain their counterintuitive impacts, 
in other words to help educate the parties involved in 
the security domain. In this respect we alert the reader 
that the emphasis (to be shown below) on the 
“feedback loops” of the models is of the utmost 
importance. A key tenet of system dynamics is that the 
interplay of the feedback loops shapes the behavior 
over time of the system.  
The reader who does not have background in 
system dynamics should read the short introduction in 
ref. [11], which also can be found online in the 
homepage of the System Dynamics Society as the 
entry “What is SD”.  
 
5. Understanding the boomerang effects of 
misaligned incentives 
 
Since we want to introduce the logic of our 
argument using system dynamics models it pays to 
choose a case as simple as possible so that the models 
are themselves simple enough. The simplest case that 
comes to mind relates to security issues when banks in 
Europe and the US introduced Automatic Telling 
Machines (ATMs).  
In a survey of fraud against Automatic Telling 
Machines (ATMs) at the time of their introduction 
[12], Anderson found that patterns of fraud depended 
on whether the bank’s customer or the bank itself was 
liable. In the USA, if a customer disputed a transaction, 
the bank had the burden of proof that the customer was 
mistaken or lying; this gave the banks a motive to 
protect their systems properly. But in several European 
countries (including Britain, Norway and the 
Netherlands), the customer had the burden of proof: the 
bank was right unless the customer could prove it 
wrong – an almost impossible task. The “lucky” banks 
in these countries became complacent and careless. 
Eventually, epidemics of fraud demolished their 
complacency. In contrast, the banks in the USA and 
other countries having the burden of proof suffered 
much less fraud. Most remarkably, they spent less 
money on security than their European counterparts. 
Thus, better aligned incentives, whereby the defender 
suffered most if security was bad, turned out to be the 
best investment for the banks and for the banks’ 
customers as well [1, p. 611, 12]. 
For the record: After suffering from the bad 
experience the European banks changed the rules so 
that the burden of proof no longer was on the customer. 
 
5.1. Qualitative model of ATM security 
 
Consider first the European ATM case. A typical 
bank acted by setting up the ATM system so that if the 
customer disputed the transaction, the burden of proof 
was on the customer. Thus, the bank’s intervention is 
‘Burden of proof on customers’, see Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Qualitative model (archetype) for the European 
ATM case 
The intended outcome of the bank’s intervention 
was to reduce the number of fraudulent transactions by 
the customer (represented by the variable ‘Fraudulent 
transactions’). The influence arrow from ‘Burden of 
proof on customers’ to ‘Fraudulent transactions’ has a 
minus sign – a negative polarity – expressing that the 
two variables move in opposite direction. That is, if the 
burden of proof on customers is increased, the outcome 
– fraudulent transactions – gets reduced (and vice 
versa). 
The degree to which the intended outcome has been 
achieved impacts back on the intervention with 
positive polarity – the more/less fraudulent 
transactions, the stronger/weaker the bank’s 
intervention is applied. Thus, one has as intended 
consequence a control strategy, expressed by the 
balancing feedback loop labelled ‘B: Customer is 
liable’. 
The unintended consequence of the bank putting 
the burden of proof on the customer is an increase in 
the bank’s complacency [1, p. 611] – shown on Figure 
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1  by the influence arrow from ‘Burden of proof in 
customers’ to ‘Bank’s complacency’. Note that this 
arrow has positive polarity, expressing that the 
variables move in the same direction. That is, an 
increase in the burden of proof exerted on customers 
increases the bank’s complacency, whereas if the bank 
exerted less pressure on making the customer liable, 
the bank’s complacency would decrease. 
In turn, the variable ‘Bank’s complacency’ 
influences ‘ATM security’ with negative polarity: an 
increase in the bank’s carelessness decreases the ATM 
security over time – with some time delay, indicated by 
||, as too little is done to analyze the causes of fraud, 
discover vulnerabilities and exploits, and remedy them. 
Over time, again with some delay, ‘ATM security’ 
influences ‘Fraudulent transactions’ with negative 
polarity – expressing that a decrease in ‘ATM security’ 
increases the rate of fraudulent transactions – as more 
and more crooks discover the poor security in the 
ATMs.  
Note that the influence arrow from fraudulent 
transactions to burden of proof on the customer closes 
a second feedback loop. Walking along the influence 
links and considering their polarities it can be 
recognized that this feedback look is reinforcing (R): 
if, e.g., the bank increases the burden of proof on 
customers, the chain of influences along the feedback 
loop ‘R: ATM fraud epidemic’, ultimately forces the 
bank to a further increase of the burden of proof on the 
customers. The bank’s intervention can be 
characterized as ‘barking up the wrong tree’, since the 
intervention is directed to the bank’s customers, 
whereas most of the fraud arises from crooks that 
exploit the neglected bad ATM security. The straight 
line in the lower half of Figure 1 serves as reminder 
that the unintended consequence is ‘hidden’ beyond a 
mental boundary of the decision makers in the bank: 
the unintended consequence is not seen until the 
resulting ATM fraud epidemic forced a reconsideration 
of the European bank’s strategy. 
The causal loop displayed on Figure 1  is an out-of-
control problem archetype [13]. The balancing 
feedback loop ‘B: Customer is liable’ expresses the 
intended consequence of the bank’s its strategy, viz. to 
control fraud. The unintended consequence is 
expressed by the reinforcing feedback loop ‘R: ATM 
fraud epidemic’. Reinforcing feedback loops can act 
viciously or virtuously, depending on whether they are 
triggered to increase or decrease unpleasant effects. In 
this case, the reinforcing feedback loop is vicious 
indeed. Owing to the banks’ refusal to recognize their 
prominent part in the bad ATM security [12] – 
expressed symbolically by the boundary line on Figure 
1 – and the time delays in the chain of influences, the 
crooks produced an avalanche of fraud that at long last 
caused major customer dissatisfaction, loss of 
reputation and ultimately forced the banks to improve 
the neglected ATM security – at much higher costs 
than a well-designed proactive security would have 
required [1, 12]. 
Figure 2 adds to the problem archetype of Figure 1 
a solution balancing feedback loop (labeled in Figure 2 
with ‘B: Bank awakes at last’). The bank’s new 
intervention consists in fixing the vulnerabilities in the 
ATMs in relation to the occurring fraudulent 
transactions so as to improve the ATM security – all 
processes that consume considerable time, indicated by 
the time-delayed influence arrows (marked ||).  
 
Figure 2 Solution archetype for the European ATM case 
 
Note that the line labeled ‘boundary’ is shown 
stippled in Figure 2 – indicating that the mental barrier 
hiding the unintended consequence from the sight of 
the decision maker has become ‘transparent’ upon 
reflection and understanding. An insightful decision 
requires consideration of all the relevant aspects of the 
problem. 
In the US ATM case if the customer disputes a 
ATM transaction the burden of the proof is on the 
bank. Thus, the bank’s intervention is ‘Burden of proof 
on bank’ on Figure 3. The intended consequence was 
to reduce the number of fraudulent transactions 
(represented by the variable ‘Fraudulent transactions’) 
to some acceptable target. The bank assumed the 
responsibility and spent resources on ATM security as 
needed (expressed by ‘Security spending’) [1, 12], 
which affected fraudulent transactions with negative 
polarity. To the extent that fraudulent transactions 
occurred, the burden of proof on the bank was exerted, 
closing the loop. The intended consequence was 
controlling, resulting in a balancing feedback loop, 
labeled ‘B: Bank is liable’. 
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Figure 3 Archetype for the US ATM case 
Customers and non-customers know that it is 
difficult and costly for the bank to prove who did the 
fraudulent transaction. They know too that the bank 
will not act if the fraudulent transactions involve small 
sums of money. Hence, dishonest customers and 
professional crooks speculated on that, and (with some 
time delay) they came up with ingenious ‘Fraud 
schemes’ (positive polarity), which increased the 
number of ‘Fraudulent transactions’ (positive polarity). 
The unintended outcome was a reinforcing loop (‘R: 
Betting on the bank to accept the loss’). We may 
assume that this unintended consequence was ‘hidden’ 
from the sight of the decision maker – expressed by the 
straight line labeled ‘boundary’. If not completely 
hidden, we may assume that the bank did not act 
proactively to mitigate this kind of small fraud until it 
became sufficiently numerous and costly.  
Figure 4 expresses that the typical US bank 
ultimately developed innovative solutions to stay ahead 
of the crooks (as expressed by the new balancing 
solution loop ‘B: Improving to beat the crooks’). 
Also for the US case the causal loop on Figure 3 is 
an out-of-control problem archetype, following the 
terminology of Wolstenholme [13]. But the impact of 
the out-of-control archetypes was quite different for 
European and American banks. 
In the European case the banks did not pay enough 
attention to the ATM security. As the unintended 
consequence showed up, with significant time delays 
(Figure 1), the banks were increasingly facing bad 
publicity and loss of customers, as well as getting 
involved in costly court disputes. Sometimes the 
customers won, making the banks losing face. In the 
end, the banks had no choice but to acknowledge that 
the original security solution was bad. They 
compensated affected customers and had improve 
security (feedback loop ‘B: The bank awakes at last’, 
Figure 2). The security investments were very costly, 
since the ATM system was not designed with security 
in mind, and the solution was less good than if the 
bank had made security a strong priority in the first 
place [12]. 
Figure 4 Solution archetype for the US ATM case 
In the US case, the banks designed the ATM 
system with security in mind. Figure 3 shows that 
ATM security is embedded in the intended outcome 
feedback loop.  
Although advances in fraud schemes forced the US 
banks to enhance the ATM security, the fact that the 
banks were security aware and that they were not 
losing face facilitated a quick reaction and the remedy 
was less costly than in the European case. This is in 
accordance with the facts [1, 12]. 
 
5.2. Simulation model of ATM security 
 
In the previous section §5.1 we used system 
archetypes, which are qualitative models, to suggest 
the causal structure, in terms of balancing and 
reinforcing feedback loops, to explain the observations 
about security spending and the fraud patterns when 
ATMs where taken in use in Europe and the US. 
However, the analysis of the feedback loops 
composing the archetypes cannot claim more than to 
provide plausible explanations. For more convincing 
evidence it remains to show that a simulation model 
expressing the feedback loops composing the 
archetypes is able to render the observed behavior over 
time for the fraud patterns – the ‘reference behavior’ 
for the ATMs in a typical European and a typical US 
bank. 
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Regrettably, the information available about the 
ATM security case in Europe or the US is qualitative 
and can be expressed in a few statements (p. 3) 
describing patterns of behavior, rather than providing 
numerical time series for the key variables of the 
problem. Given such scarcity of numerical data a 
‘concept’ system dynamics model is a natural choice. 
Concept models have traditionally been used by 
system dynamics practitioners to provide a platform for 
further exploration of a problem. Concept models – 
which are simplified and, thus, preliminary – serve as 
stepping stones towards a more complete 
understanding of the problem in question by providing 
insights into the causal structure that could be 
responsible for the observed over-time behavior [14]. 
At this stage, all that we require in terms of satisfying 
the reference behavior is that the simulation reproduces 
two key observations about patterns of behavior (p. 3): 
1) that ATMs in some European countries were 
exposed to an avalanche of fraud while the ATMs in 
the US were much safer; 2) that the US banks invested 
less in ATM security while their ATMs nevertheless 
were more secure than their European counterparts. 
We proceed to explain the main features of the 
concept model of the ATM cases (European and US). 
The reader interested in the complete details of the 
models can find the Vensim files in the online 
proceedings of ref. [15]. Use the free software Vensim 
PLE for inspection of the model and for simulation. 
Figure 5 shows features that are common in a system 
dynamics models for the European and the US ATM 
case.  
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Figure 5 Core structure for a systems dynamics model of the ATM case showing common structures for the European 
and the US bank 
 
 
The core model shown on Figure 5 has three 
structures representing following processes: 1) 
lifecycle of ATM vulnerabilities; 2) fraud exploiting 
ATM vulnerabilities; and 3) recruitment of fraudsters. 
Lifecycle of ATM vulnerabilities: ATMs have 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited to commit fraud. 
Vulnerabilities exist in two states, represented by the 
stocks ‘Vulnerabilities dormant’ and ‘Vulnerabilities 
active’. Dormant vulnerabilities have not yet been 
discovered and, hence, cannot be exploited. By chance 
or clever schemes, vulnerabilities are discovered and 
become ‘active – that is, exploitable. The flow 
‘vulnerability activation’ in Figure 5 represents the 
process rendering dormant to active vulnerabilities. 
Active vulnerabilities are fixed soon after they show up 
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(flow ‘vulnerability fixing’). A proactive posture 
would in addition imply investment in discovery and 
removal of as yet unknown dormant vulnerabilities to 
prevent that they could be discovered and activated by 
crooks (flow ‘vulnerability removal’ in Figure 5). 
Fraud exploiting ATM vulnerabilities: Figure 5 
shows two possible mechanisms for ATM frauds, viz 
customer and non-customer (“crook”) fraud. The 
model differentiates between frauds committed by 
bank customers and crooks since the European bank 
put the burden of proof on customers if they disputed 
transactions allegedly committed by them. The 
influence arrows from the stock ‘Vulnerabilities active’ 
to the flows ‘customer fraud rate’ and ‘crook fraud 
rate’ express that the fraud rates depend on the extent 
to which there are active vulnerabilities in the ATMs. 
Recruitment of fraudsters: Crooks (non-customer 
fraudsters) hear about the ATM vulnerabilities by 
word-of-mouth. The structure with the stocks 
“Potential non-customer fraudsters” and “Non-
customer fraudsters” represents the process of 
recruitment of fraudsters according to a standard 
process known as innovation diffusion [6, Ch. 9]. 
The variable “pressure to improve ATM security” 
describes how the strategies of European and the US 
banks (burden of proof on customers vs burden of 
proof on bank) influenced vulnerability fixing and 
removal. Accordingly, “pressure to improve ATM 
security” is affected by different processes depending 
on the strategy of the banks, as becomes apparent on 
Figure 6-7. 
The pressure to improve ATM security was 
significantly higher for US banks – who had the burden 
of proof with regards to fraud claims– than for 
European banks, who made customers liable and to 
being with didn’t suffer much when fraud was 
committed.  
Figure 6 shows the full system dynamics model for 
the European ATM case. The core structure that was 
displayed on Figure 5 is now connected by influence 
arrows so as to create feedback loops that match the 
loops contained in the system archetypes Figures 1-2 
for the European ATM case.  
The variable “proportion of non-customer fraud” 
(r.h.s. of Figure 6 next to the label “B1: Customer is 
liable”) affects “pressure to improve ATM security”. 
The more fraud was committed by fraudsters, the more 
the innocent customers of European banks suffered. 
This resulted in an escalation in angry customer 
complaints and bad publicity for European banks, 
ultimately increasing the pressure to improve ATM on 
European banks.  
 
Figure 6 Full concept system dynamics model for the European ATM case 
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The feedback loops “B1: Customer is liable”, “R. 
ATM fraud epidemics” and “B2: The bank awakes at 
last” that were already proposed for the European 
ATM archetype (Figure 2) do occur in Figure 6. 
Whereas the archetype was only a qualitative model, 
the full system dynamics model shown on Figure 6 is 
quantitative and simulatable once all the equations are 
defined. Hence, it becomes possible to trace the impact 
of the feedback loops on the behavior over time of the 
system. 
Figure 7 shows the full system dynamics model for the 
US ATM case. The core structure that was displayed 
on Figure 5 is now connected by influence arrows so as 
to create feedback loops that match the loops contained 
in the system archetypes Figures 3-4 for the US ATM 
case. Since the burden of proof is on the bank, the US 
banks assumed a proactive posture regarding ATM 
security, implying a high value of “pressure to improve 
ATM security”. 
 
Figure 7 Full concept system dynamics model for the US ATM case 
 
 
The feedback loops “B1: Bank is liable”, “R: 
“Betting on bank accepting the loss” and “B2: 
Improving to beat the crooks” that were already 
proposed for the US ATM archetype (Figure 4) do 
occur in Figure 7. Again, the figure 7 represents a 
model that can be enhanced with equations so that it 
becomes quantitative and simulatable. 
The system dynamics models on Figure 6-7 were  
designed with the simulation software Vensim DSS. 
Vensim generates equations for the stocks expressing 
that the value of the stocks accumulates the values of 
the inflows and de-accumulates the values of the 
outflows for each time step. The modeler has then to 
add equations for the remaining variables. The 
equations for the flows follow standard practice from 
system dynamics (value of the stock divided by a 
relevant time parameter). Relations between other 
variables are expressed using table functions 
expressing reasonable assumptions (such as that an 
increasing fraud rate increases the pressure on the bank 
to fix known, active vulnerabilities). 
Some reasonable assumptions have been made as to 
the total number of vulnerabilities in the ATM as well 
as to the number of dormant and active vulnerabilities 
at the start of the simulation. Similarly, reasonable 
assumptions have been made as to the average times to 
exploit vulnerabilities, to activate vulnerabilities, etc. 
We proceed to discuss the results of the simulation. 
Figure 8 displays the simulation for the total cumulated 
fraud committed over time. The curve labeled 1 
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corresponds to a typical US and curve label 2 a 
European bank. As in reality, the simulation shows an 
epidemic of fraud for the European case.  
Figure 8 Fraud committed 
Figure 9 Fraud rate 
Figure 10 Solution archetype for the US ATM case 
Figure 9 displays the fraud rate in units frauds per 
week. Whereas the fraud rate soon starts decreasing for 
the US bank, the European bank suffers an increasing 
fraud rate for a long period of time (for approximately 
100 weeks) when it finally starts decreasing as a 
consequence of the increasing pressure on the bank to 
improve ATM security (Figure 10). 
 
6. Discussion and concluding remarks  
 
In this paper we illustrated with simple qualitative 
system dynamics models (the system archetypes 
Figures 1-4) that misaligned incentives can be doubly 
misaligned: 1) because third parties, by design, suffer 
from the resulting externality; and 2) since ultimately 
the chosen security strategy can hit back the 
organization that is most responsible (or in a privileged 
position) for providing system security with a revenge. 
Then quantitative system dynamics models were 
presented. That is, the system dynamics models are 
“quantitative” in the sense that the simulated time 
series have patterns of behavior in accordance with the 
empirical findings of that led to a fraud epidemic in the 
case of the typical European bank and to much less 
fraud for the US banks. Hence, the quantitative system 
dynamics model add evidence that the feedback loops 
displayed in the system archetypes indeed shape the 
patterns of fraud that were observed. Here, we remind 
the reader of the key tenet of system dynamics (see p. 
3): the behavior over time is shaped by the feedback 
loops of the system. 
The models do not compute the security costs as 
such. However, we may assume that the banks 
ultimately had costs reflecting the amount of fraud 
committed, that is, in terms for compensating clients. 
In addition, we may assume that the fact that US banks 
removed dormant vulnerabilities to a larger extent than 
European banks will have proven less costly: dormant 
vulnerabilities that get removed get never exploited 
and, thus, by this very fact are cheaper than active 
vulnerabilities which don’t disappear until they have 
been exploited as fraud. 
Obviously, it would be preferable if the case chosen 
for the illustration of the arguments had been better 
documented in terms of empirical time series for its 
key factors. Alas, we searched and found nothing. The 
same applies for other potential cases of interest related 
to misaligned incentives, their impact on security and 
their boomerang effects. As in many areas of 
information security data is detailed data are scarce (or 
not available). Still we hope that the arguments 
presented in this paper elicit some curiosity as to the 
power of system dynamics models to help educate the 
parties in the “security battlefield”. It can be hoped that 
some organizations come to the insight that it pays to 
do some modeling to analyze the possible long-term 
boomerang effects. The cost of developing system 
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dynamics models is low and the potential gains are 
high. 
As a final remark we comment on the question as to 
whether system dynamics could help clarify causes and 
responsibilities in terms of post mortem models of 
disputed cases regarding misaligned incentives in 
information security. The question can be reworded as 
to whether a future introduction of legal measures, 
similar as those listed in “§2 Proposed measures” 
should be preceded by an analysis as to factors that 
should be documented and recorded so as to allow post 
mortem analysis of responsibilities and liabilities.  
In all countries the government ultimately acts as 
the regulator of last resort and if given good inputs 
could do so more effectively. In this paper we have 
shown that concept system dynamics models can 
provide such “inputs” and do so in a way that can be 
deployed in digital form for eGovernment. In future 
work we hope to elicit the interest of experts on system 
dynamics modeling of project management and of 
legal disputes on project failures to provide 
recommendations so as to make system dynamics an 
assistant and guard for legal measures in information 
security. 
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